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The Public Funding of Health Care: A Brief Historical Overview of
Principles, Practices, and Motives
Abstract

Nationally sponsored programs designed to fund health care for the general public are largely a twentieth
century phenomenon. Yet a long glance backward at the medical and public health history of Western
civilization, extending from the ancient Greeks to the twentieth century, reveals earlier periods when
governments, religious institutions, and other groups provided some measure of medical relief for the sick, the
poor, and the homeless. In this essay, I will provide not an exhaustive but rather an illustrative account of this
oft forgotten fact. My objectives are threefold.
First, to remind us that the active concern of society for the health of its citizens is hardly a new development
arising full born, as it were, out of the biomedical revolution and refined moral sensibilities of our present age.
As I will suggest, our current interest in public health, and the related question of how to allocate medical
resources fairly, is part of a larger evolutionary social process. Second, to conjecture that the impulse of caring
for the sick and injured, using public or private resources,1 is typically driven by a variety of sometimes
overlapping motivations, both religious and secular in origin. Third, to indicate that no single monolithic
philosophy of providing medical care for the masses emerges from the historical record. That is, no unified
pattern of health care organization or individual or communal motivation can plausibly account for this
seemingly altruistic behavior, behavior which is putatively aimed at promoting the common good of all
members of society.
Given the interdisciplinary scope of this discussion, my inquiry will weave together sociological,
psychological, and philosophical strands of evidence. Constraints of length will limit us primarily to
developments in Europe and the United States. In the end, a limited sampling of societal practices, individual
or communal motivations, and philosophical considerations will indicate that no simple story can be told
about the public or private funding of health care.
Proceeding more or less chronologically, I will introduce evidence demonstrating that redemptive, utilitarian,
prudential, and charitable impulses (among others) are at work in the humane decision to use public or
private funds to provide medical care for the benefit of the sick or infirm. While I do not claim that these four
motivations constitute a complete list, they do emerge as a recurring and significant typology — helping to
solidify the emerging modern public health movement in England, the United States, and elsewhere in the
West by the late nineteenth century.
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The Public Funding of
Health Care
A Brief Historical Overview of Principles,
Practices, and Motives

Old age is a natural disease, while disease is an acquired old age. (Aristotle,
Generation ofAnimals 5.49.784b.33)

Introduction
Nationally sponsored programs designed to fund health care for the
general public are largely a twentieth century phenomenon. Yet a long
glance backward at the medical and public health history of Western
civilization, extending from the ancient Greeks to the twentieth century,
reveals earlier periods when governments, religious institutions, and
other groups provided some measure of medical relief for the sick, the
poor, and the homeless. In this essay, I will provide not an exhaustive
but rather an illustrative account of this oft forgotten fact. My objectives
are threefold.
First, to remind us that the active concern of society for the health of its
citizens is hardly a new development arising full born, as it were, out of
the biomedical revolution and refined moral sensibilities of our present
age. As I will suggest, our current interest in public health, and the
related question of how to allocate medical resources fairly, is part of a
larger evolutionary social process. Second, to conjecture that the
impulse of caring for the sick and injured, using public or private
resources,1 is typically driven by a variety of sometimes overlapping
]

The phrase 'public or private resources' is used advisedly. There are relatively
few well documented cases prior to about 1850 when public funds alone went
toward rendering medical care to the sick or infirm. More typically, such efforts
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motivations, both religious and secular in origin. Third, to indicate that
no single monolithic philosophy of providing medical care for the
masses emerges from the historical record. That is, no unified pattern of
health care organization or individual or communal motivation can
plausibly account for this seemingly altruistic behavior, behavior which
is putatively aimed at promoting the common good of all members of
society.
Given the interdisciplinary scope of this discussion, my inquiry will
weave together sociological, psychological, and philosophical strands
of evidence. Constraints of length will limit us primarily to develop
ments in Europe and the United States. In the end, a limited sampling of
societal practices, individual or communal motivations, and philosoph
ical considerations will indicate that no simple story can be told about
the public or private funding of health care.
Proceeding more or less chronologically, I will introduce evidence
demonstrating that redemptive, utilitarian, prudential, and charitable
impulses (among others) are at work in the humane decision to use pub
lic or private funds to provide medical care for the benefit of the sick or
infirm. While I do not claim that these four motivations constitute a
complete list, they do emerge as a recurring and significant typology —
helping to solidify the emerging modern public health movement in
England, the United States, and elsewhere in the West by the late nine
teenth century.

The Public Health Movement and Distributive Justice
Struggling to survive amidst the social upheaval of the Industrial Revo
lution from about 1750 and well into the next century, peasants, labour
ers, share-croppers and others migrated from rural to urban areas—first
in Europe and later in America —in search of a better life and regular
employment. Instead, workers were routinely paid subsistence wages
and laboured twelve to sixteen hour days in grinding, suffocating facto
ries and other industrial environments in cities like Manchester, Liver
pool, Chicago, and Boston. What's more, the unwashed masses were
frequently shunted into crowded, unsanitary tenements in major eco
nomic centres such as Paris, London, and New York. Not surprisingly,
the poor, hungry, and homeless were usually the hardest hit by infec
tious (communicable) diseases and other debilitating ailments. In fact,
their miseries were redoubled by overcrowded tenement housing in the
larger cities by the end of the eighteenth century and throughout the
nineteenth century as well. These squalid living and working conditions
contributed to new levels of urban blight and the inevitable spread of
involved funds from both the wealthier classes, acting charitably, and from
governmental sources, acting prudentially.
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infectious diseases like cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, smallpox, yel
low fever, and measles.
Indeed, the modern public health movement may be understood, in
part, as a humane response to the collective misery brought about by the
Industrial Revolution and its introduction of steam power to run the
massive factory machines, and by the population shifts which it pro
voked as workers were lured from country farms and villages to, in
effect, become willing cogs in those often dehumanizing machines. The
public health ethos represents a response on the part of doctors, nurses,
city officials, clergy, and governmental leaders who personally or pro
fessionally cared about the future of their cities and towns. Understand
ably, they cared, too, about the preservation of their own and their
families' and their communities' health in the face of these profound
demographic migrations and accompanying threat of the outbreak of
epidemic diseases that left no one feeling secure. In addition, poor per
sonal hygiene, foul drinking water, spoiled food, lack of sanitation,
putrid air — these and other factors were also commonly thought to be
involved in undermining the health of the masses. However prejudicial
or misleading, the views of a growing cohort of public health officials
held sway with the establishment as their opinions were echoed in
newspapers and summarized in public health notices posted publicly
during the 1800 and 1900s in both England and the United States,
according to social historian Roy Porter (Porter, 1999, pp. 397-427 pas
sim).
Hence, by the opening decades of the 1800s some reasonably helpful
public health measures were deployed. These included educational
tracts about the importance of personal hygiene (cleanliness, it turns out,
really was next to godliness); church sponsored kitchens for the care and
feeding of the displaced and the poor; and early feminist social cam
paigns that stressed the need for improved sanitation. These efforts cul
minated in the so-called 'sanitation movement' that lobbied for closed
sewers, potable drinking water, and other important environmental
reforms. In addition, many churches and other religious organizations
sponsored sermons aimed specifically at the poor, widowed, and
orphaned. These stressed the need for 'good work habits', 'clean mor
als', regular bathing or, if needed, de-licing, medical examinations, etc.
To be sure, however mixed the overall results were in actually protect
ing lives against infectious diseases like cholera and smallpox, such pub
lic health measures did indeed cost the state and other sponsoring
organizations money. While most of the revenues to cover these costs
came from government treasuries, other funding derived from such
non-governmental entities as churches, guilds, professional societies,
and wealthy families. The latter tended to view their contributions as a
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civic or religious duty if not also as an insurance policy against class war
fare.
Furthermore, by the middle of the nineteenth century, what could be
called the emerging public health movement and its tacit commitment to
promote sound hygiene and public sanitation for all, began slowly to be
codified into law. In England, this reform was embodied in three key
pieces of legislation.
First, the (revised) New Poor Law of 1834. This was encouraged by the
utilitarian reformer and founder of the Sanitary Movement in Britain,
Edwin Chadwick (1800-90). Among other things, the law created a sin
gle scale of benefit to the poor across England, without local variations
(Chave, 1984, p. 5). It also provided subsistence, medicine, work, and
crude housing for the indigent but able-bodied poor who,
unsurprisingly, suffered in disproportionate numbers from a variety of
chronic and debilitating diseases. But Chadwick came to see that the
revised workhouse conditions created by the New Poor Law, a law that
was actually intended to reduce the number of families on public relief
by creating harsh workhouse conditions involving the separation of
families, long hours of employment, and the lowest possible pay, in
point of fact increased the number of families seeking subsistence
wages. This puzzled him. He studied the situation in great detail, culmi
nating in his monumental Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring
Population of Great Britain (1842). This report to Parliament documented,
among other things, that not fecklessness or sloth (as he and others had
heretofore ruefully claimed) but rather disease and disability were over
whelmingly the primary causes of poverty. In addition, to overcome
these unhealthy conditions, actions needed to be taken by municipal
governments to provide clean drinking water, rid towns and cities of
cesspools and piles of garbage that bred disease, and eventually estab
lish oversight and enforcement mechanisms. Disturbingly, Chadwick's
report showed that the average age of death for the poorest laborer in
London's worst slums was 16, while the better-off laborer lived to about
age forty-five. 'Poverty could not be abolished, but the poverty due to
preventable diseases could be', Chadwick declared. Given his powers of
persuasion and careful documentation, he convinced Parliament that
the situation among the urban poor was indeed dire (Porter, 1999, p.
411).
Second, this sense of urgency led to the passage of the England's first
Public Health Act of 1848. This act created a central governmental
authority, the General Board of Health. It compelled all cities and towns
to establish boards of health responsible for implementing and enforc
ing sanitary conditions for drainage, water, garbage removal, housing,
waste disposal, and the regulation of 'offensive trades' like butchering,
slaughtering, tanning, etc. Shortly thereafter, in 1849, an English physi
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cian and epidemiologist by the name of John Snow (1813-1858), tested
this law. He published his controversial On the Mode of Communication of
Cholera. 'Questioning [Chadwick's preferred] miasmatism, he argued
that cholera could not be spread by a poison in the ambient air [as had
been widely held], since it affected the intestines not the lung" (Porter,
1999, p. 413). In fact, Snow suspected that cholera was not a contagion at
all but rather a water-borne disease. A significant breakthrough
occurred in August of 1854, when Snow traced 93 local cholera deaths to
a single source, namely, contaminated drinking water drawn from Lon
don's Broad Street Pump. Snow moved quickly. On September 7th, he
persuaded the Board of Guardians in Soho to remove the offending
pump. The Board was at first skeptical but reluctantly agreed. Within
months, local cholera deaths in Soho dropped precipitously. Thus,
Snow's theory was confirmed in no small measure due to his persistent
detective work and the regulatory governing structure created by the
aforementioned Public Health Act of 1848 (Porter, 1999, pp. 412-3).
Interestingly, in France the work of Louis Rene Villerme (1782-1863)
almost paralleled the statistical conclusions of Chadwick. In fact,
Villerme's ' ... morbidity and mortality statistics also demonstrated a
close correlation between health and living standards, and led the
French government to establish a national public health advisory com
mittee in 1848' (Duffy, 2004, p. 2207).
Third, there was the further development in England of legislation
leading to yet another consolidating piece of legislation designed to for
tify public health regulations.
The sanitary legislation developed since 1848 was consolidated in the codify
ing Public Health Act of 1875, requiring the appointment of a medical officer
of health to every sanitary district in England and Wales, while the Poor Law
and public health administration were amalgamated in 1872 in the Local
Government Board. [Hence], the medical expert's role in public administra
tion had been established, and local government had acquired extensive pub
lic health powers (Porter, 1999, p. 414).

And so the Public Health Act of 1875 formally and systematically
acknowledged the role of government to provide minimal levels of sani
tation and sound hygiene for all citizens. This astonishing moral, social,
and scientifically informed commitment, based on the realization that
the strength of society as a whole depends on the sound health of all its
citizens, eventually paved the way in Britain to the establishment of the
National Health Service by 1948, and in the United States to the estab
lishment of the National Institutes of Health, during that same year.
Coincidentally, the World Health Organization of the United Nations,
dedicated to eradicating disease and stopping pandemics wherever
they occur, was also established in 1948.
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But compared to Great Britain, the rise of the public health movement
in the United States developed at a somewhat slower pace. This was due
in part to the fact that England was the first country in Europe to experi
ence the displacing and dehumanizing social effects of the factory sys
tem. Then, too, the United States was a younger nation. Her westward
expansion by rail from New York to California was not complete until
about 1890, and steam power took a little longer than in England to be
adapted for factory use. In due time, her major cities began to swell first
with displaced labourers and farmers looking to improve their lot in the
cities, and then with European and Asian immigrants seeking the
greater economic opportunities promised by the American experiment.
Hence, by the mid to late 1800s, this led to sanitation and related urban
problems associated with overcrowding, squalid tenement conditions,
and generally overwrought infrastructure. The rates of morbidity and
mortality began to rise, especially in the larger cities. Medical historian
John Duffy expands:
The movement to remedy these conditions was initiated largely by physi
cians, most notably Benjamin W. McCready, whose 1837 essay drew atten
tion to the deplorable health conditions in the workplace and the slum
housing the workers, and [also] by John H. Griscom, whose 1845 report, The
Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of New York, laid the basis for
establishing the first effective municipal health department in the United
States. [Another] ... outstanding layman of the early health movement was
Lemuel Shattuck of Boston, who pioneered in the collection of vital statistics
and promoted sanitary reform ... As in England, the public health movement
was both a humanitarian and moral crusade. A few reformers emphasized
improving the morals of the poor. [B]ut most recognized that immorality and
intemperance were closely associated with the crowded and brutally
degraded living conditions of the poor (Duffy, 2004, p. 2206).

Thus, America's first National Board of Health was instituted in 1879.
This occurred largely in response to the terrifying yellow fever epidemic
of 1878 which spread like wildfire across state lines. In particular, yellow
fever took its human toll up and down the Mississippi River. It was
thought to be carried by commercial steamboats and their crews that
plied the muddy waters from New Orleans to St. Louis. This outbreak
killed over 50% of the people in some places. (Porter, 1999, p. 418) With
the germ theory of disease (demonstrated in 1878 by Louis Pasteur, and
expanded in 1882 by his arch rival Robert Koch) now equipping
state-sponsored public health functions with a plausible new rationale
for the scientific treatment and eradication of disease, 'the USA was
active in setting up publicly supported bacteriological laboratories for
disease diagnosis and control' by the last decades of the nineteenth cen
tury (Porter, 1999, p. 419). Partly as a result of this social upheaval and
this revolutionary aspect of disease diagnosis, the role of the federal
government expanded to include the coordination of state health
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boards. These entities typically consisted of a patchwork quilt of local
and regional offices usually run by political appointees and overseen by
at least one medical doctor. In 1912, President Theodore Roosevelt
(1858-1919) acted decisively to bring these bodies into greater harmony
with each other and with the public they aimed to protect. Specifically,
he transformed the Marine Hospital Service, then under the limited
authority of the surgeon-general, into the more powerful United States
Public Health Service.
From this point forward, there was no turning back politically or
philosophically. The federal government would increasingly play a crit
ical role in monitoring and regulating health care standards throughout
the United States. It would use public funds to achieve these goals and,
at the same time, work in consultation with one of the most powerful
professional lobbies ever established on the American scene, namely,
the venerable American Medical Association (first established in 1847,
and followed in 1872 by the establishment of the American Public
Health Association).
What's more, during the 'New Deal' reforms of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (1882-1945) in the 1930s, a series of public health laws were
adopted that further expanded the federal government's responsibility
for the health and welfare of its citizens.
From June 1933, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration promoted
rural sanitation and participated in schemes to control malaria and other dis
eases. Also, the Public Works Administration built hospitals and contributed
to other public health projects. In 1935 the Social Security Act authorized the
use of federal funds for crippled children, maternity and child care, and the
promotion of state and local public health agencies (Porter, 1999, pp. 646-7).

But in 1945, John Duffy recalls that when President Harry Truman
(1884-1972) proposed a national health insurance program, he ignited
the ire of the powerful AMA which promptly denounced it as 'socialized
medicine', something mainstream Americans felt skittish about since, at
worst, it smacked of Soviet-like state control of people's lives and
seemed to threaten their personal privacy. Moreover, in 1948, when Tru
man again made national health insurance a campaign issue, the AMA
hired a powerful public relations agency and activated a speaker's
bureau to defeat this measure — dubiously claiming that national health
insurance would lead to a failure of medical services similar to Britain's
bureaucratic behemoth. Nevertheless, the AMA reluctantly ceded to the
Kerr-Mill bill, 'providing limited federal funds to help states pay for
medical costs of the aged' (Duffy, 1993, p. 322).
In addition, during President Dwight Eisenhower's (1890-1969)
administration of the 1950s, a central cabinet level office—the Depart
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare —was established. It brought
greater order and accountability to what had hitherto been only a loose
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association of multiple federal and state agencies. Collectively, these
regulatory and enforcement agencies would now be anchored in Washington DC. They would continue to carry out their growing responsibili
ties, including public health services such as public education programs
aimed at curbing alcohol abuse and cigarette smoking, along with the
regulation of health and safety conditions in schools and factories, and
the oversight of the safety and efficacy of food and drugs.
Later on, by the mid-1960s, the Democratic Party renewed its drive for
a national health insurance program that Truman had earlier championed but failed to implement. John Duffy recalls that although the AMA
was unsuccessful in blocking this second effort, it did manage to weaken
its scope. So, in 1965, the Social Security laws were amended and
Medicare and Medicaid became a reality. Medicare, which took effect in
1966, provided hospital and medical services to citizens who reached
the age of sixty five. In contrast, Medicaid allocated federal assistance to
state medical programs for the indigent poor. In sum, while Medicare
made no attempt at a wholesale restructuring of the American
healthcare system, it more than symbolized 'that the public would
henceforth have a voice in determining the nation's health policy'
(Duffy, 1993, p. 322.).
To be sure, just how one defines 'public health', or the allied concept,
'medical care', is of critical importance. Let's pause to clarify these key
concepts.2 By 'medical care', I mean the use of any diagnostic, therapeu
tic, or prognostic tool, treatment, or service adopted by qualified healers
in a given society. Although the therapies of these healers may change
over time, it is essential that they are believed to be conducive to the res
toration or preservation of health. For example, in 400 BC Athens, the use
of leeches to stop bleeding from a wound or infection would qualify as
medical care on this definition. But merely supplying to a soldier a well
fitting saddle for his horse, would not. For in this latter case there is no
medical treatment involved per se, no real therapy—even though the
saddle doubtlessly does contribute to the health and safety of both rider
and horse.
In contrast, 'public health' may be more broadly defined. John Duffy
calls it'... the collective action by a community or society to protect and
promote the health and welfare of its members' (Duffy, 2004, p. 2206).
Note that under this definition, the supply of a properly fitting saddle
may very well qualify as a public health measure, assuming this was
made available to other citizens, too. In addition, physician and public
health historian George Rosen observes that
[2]

In some cases, these concepts overlap in actual usage even though they retain
their distinct meanings. Such ambiguities are usually resolved by paying
attention to the contexts of use.

1
I

I

'
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the major problems of health ... have been concerned with community life,
for instance, the control of transmissible disease, the control and improve
ment of the physical environment (sanitation), the provision of water and
food of good quality and in sufficient supply, the provision of medical care,
and the relief of disability and destitution. The relative emphasis placed on
each of these problems has varied from time to time, but they are all closely
related, and from them has come [the notion of] public health as we know it
today (Rosen, 1958, p. 25, my emphasis).

Given Rosen's orientation, which I am inclined to adopt, what are
some related guiding principles or perspectives regularly associated
with the field of public health today? At least three elements deserve our
special attention.
First, the community health perspective is a key element in helping us
understand the history and political influence of this field. It states that
the health or disease of an individual citizen is, to some degree, the
proper concern and responsibility of the larger community or govern
ment within which he or she lives and works. Notwithstanding the
swaths of evidence from previous centuries that we will be exploring,
the acceptance by many progressive governments during the twentieth
century of some level of responsibility for the health of citizens consti
tutes a significant social and political commitment not matched in ear
lier epochs. Consider two examples: Plato, from antiquity, and Thomas
More, from the Renaissance. They envisioned nothing even approach
ing a comprehensive community health perspective in their writings.
Granted, in his Republic, Plato (427-347 BC) did criticize physicians who
futilely treated their terminal patients, thereby implicitly bilking them
and draining the medical resources of the state. But he nowhere system
atically tackles the question of distributive justice in connection with the
allocation of medical resources (Carrick, 2001, p. 7). Nor would such a
question have naturally occurred to him: it was just assumed in ancient
Greece that matters of personal health were not subject to interference or
regulation by the state.
Similarly, Thomas More (1478-1535), in his imaginative treatise Uto
pia, advocated a limited public role for physicians in the lives of his citi
zens. He, too, implicitly emphasized that each person needed to accept
responsibility for the state of his or her own health. Granted, More did
advocate the option of voluntary euthanasia so that the terminally ill or
decrepit could find some appropriate end to their suffering in the inglo
rious winter of their lives. But, again, neither Plato nor More entertained
anything like a government directed public health ethos of the sort we
are investigating.
Ironically, that formidable vision issued, with mixed results, from the
pen of the nineteenth century social revolutionary Karl Marx (1818-83),
and his capitalist backer, Friedrich Engels (1820-95). It is easy to forget
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that in Marx's provocative Communist Manifesto he held out the hope for
social equality for all workers. He implied too that when the bourgeoisie
and capitalism were overthrown by violent revolution, then the class
distinctions that created double standards and inadequate systems of
education and possibly health care would also be a thing of the past
(Marx, 1848, pp. 47-50 passim). Hence, the Marxist-inspired institutions
of pre-1992 Russia under the former Soviet Union, arguably adminis
tered the most extensive state-controlled public health care system in
medical history. By most accounts, this resulted in a notoriously uneven,
impersonal, and sometimes inhumane system of medical services for
Soviet citizens (particularly in the areas of psychiatric, maternal, and
geriatric medicine).3
Second, returning to our central discussion, I find that beyond the
community health perspective just mentioned there is something that
could be called the holistic health perspective. This constitutes another
essential element in the field of public health. It states that an individ
ual's health properly concerns not simply her personal factors like exer
cise, diet, or genetic heritage. It also involves much larger societal factors
such as adequate sanitation, decent housing, workplace safety, clean air
and water, and a host of related external environmental factors. Holisti
cally considered, these external, non-personal factors that contribute to a
citizen's overall health are seen as the government's responsibility to
develop and regulate, in accord with what is judged to be in the best
interests of the people.
Third, philosophers, theologians, social reformers, and public health
professionals, among others, will recognize the contentious role that the
philosophical principle of 'moral legalism' has sometimes played in
attempting to promote a healthier society. This is the third element of the
public health movement. In many ways, it is the most controversial and
contentious. Moral legalism is a liberty-limiting principle. It states that
there is a moral duty on the part of governments to enact laws that
would prohibit objectionable behaviour, especially behaviour that, if
left unchecked, would pollute, harm, or disgrace the larger community.4
Anthropologically, moral legalism is said to have its root in the ancient
human tendencies to label, ostracize, or banish members of a society as
[31

[4]

For more on medical abuses within the Soviet Union see Bloch and Reddawy
(1984).
This principle may be seen as an expansion of the harm principle, according to
which individual liberty is justifiably limited only if it prevents harm to others.
According to John Stuart Mill (1806-73) in his On Liberty, this is the sole legitimate
principle that would warrant government to restrict the liberty of citizens. Mill
would resist any expansion of the harm principle, and would view the principle
of moral legalism as going too far by authorizing the state to engage in
paternalistic practices which it has no business doing (Mill, 1859,1971).
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'outcasts' who break taboos or allegedly pollute others by carrying out
behaviours deemed harmful to the tribe (Beauchamp, 2004, p. 2231.)
In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, such behaviours as the
over-consumption of alcohol, cigarette or marijuana smoking, and
homosexual or inter-racial marriage have, at various times, been judged
'morally objectionable' and been proscribed — in part, by appealing to
the principle of moral legalism. Moreover, this liberty-limiting principle
is sometimes also in the air when legislators and other architects of pub
lic policy try to ascertain what commonly held moral intuitions of their
constituents, supplemented by the best scientific insights, would plausi
bly justify laws aiming to promote the public health and common good
of society.
Consider an example: would requiring food handlers to thoroughly
wash their hands every thirty minutes constitute a sound public health
law? Or is this requirement too stringent and ultimately unenforceable?
Obviously, any such deliberation within a democratic framework needs
to be carefully balanced. On one hand, there is the constitutionally guar
anteed (and potentially reckless) liberty-right of the individual citizen to
be left alone to pursue life, liberty, and happiness (even if, in some cases,
the citizen does things that are technically legal but offensive to others).
On the other hand, there is the paternalistic (and potentially overzealous) duty and responsibility of the state to protect its citizens and affirm
its vision of the common good. In this capacity, it may of course pro
scribe behaviours it deems harmful to the body politic. Therefore, con
cepts and schemes for promoting public health intersect in natural ways
with higher order moral issues such as 'distributive justice'. For exam
ple, in a public health situation, consider this question: who ought to
receive life prolonging heart or lung transplants when there may not be
enough donor organs to go around for all those in need?
Lastly, what standards of social harmony and fair play ought we as
philosophers, politicians, public policy analysts, legislators, and
informed citizens to use when determining precisely what a just health
care system should look like? Obviously, this is both a moral and legal
question—and a question of great political and humanitarian intrigue in
the United States where, astonishingly, nearly 20% of the population
carries no health insurance whatsoever.
These and related social justice topics are taken up with considerable
energy and insight in the ensuing chapters of this volume. It is my con
tention that almost all such medically-related social justice questions are
either rooted in, or can be shown to be anticipated by, the public health
movement we are examining. But before proceeding any further, I
would like to affirm Daniel Beauchamp's instructive list of four goals
that any sound philosophy of public health must aim to accomplish.
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1. A philosophy of public health must give a central place to the unique
approach and method of public health, with its distinctive emphasis on com
munity, and on the central role of the scientific method in formulating courses
of action for social improvement.
2. A philosophy of public health must give priority to prevention, and must
challenge and revise explanations for health problems with the community
perspective, which is essential to effective prevention.

3. A philosophy of public health must set out and defend an adequate defini
tion of the common good, taking into account public health's pursuit of the
common well-being — measured in terms of rates of disease and early
death — as the object of group or common action.
4. While the philosophy of public health must acknowledge the claims of
individual autonomy and justify actions that limit liberty and autonomy, it
must do so in a way that leaves the community perspective and the common
good intact (Beauchamp, 2004, p. 2211).

Let us turn, then, to some of the more significant pages of that long his
tory. Our goal will be met if we locate and analyse several distinct occa
sions when redemptive, utilitarian, prudential, or charitable motives
worked to provide a measure of funding aimed at helping to preserve or
restore the general health of citizens.

The Redemptive Motive and Funding Hospitals
Today, we may rightly think of major hospitals as largely secular institu
tions; as showcases of scientific medicine aimed at restoring or prolong
ing human life by using the latest high tech therapies against the ravages
of disease or hardships of injury; and, in America and elsewhere in the
developed world, as largely public institutions receiving large portions
of their revenues from government grants, matching funds, or reim
bursements.
But among the earliest hospitals in the West were religious institu
tions and these were decidedly low tech. Their funding was generally
not from governments, and their caregivers and sponsors were ani
mated, at least in part, by the redemptive motive to care for the sick and
suffering as God had ordained. By 'redemptive motive', I mean that an
agent is acting in such a way that he earnestly believes that his action will
elevate his soul in the eyes of heaven. This occurs by cancelling a per
sonal sin or earning merit from the deity in accord with the specific
prophesies or rituals of a particular religious tradition.
To illustrate, early Christian hospitals arose largely within the social
milieu of religiously minded men and women who, in their personal
acts of attending to the sick, were also seeking to fulfil God's word. Was
not Christ portrayed in the Gospels (see especially Luke) as a healer of the
poor, one who restored sight to the blind, purged devils from the insane,
and miraculously raised Lazarus from the dead? In fact, the first hospital
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serving the general public was founded in 390 AD by a wealthy Christian
woman, Fabiola (d. 399). As a new and spirited convert, she decided to
sell all her worldly possessions to provide medical care for the sick and
poor (Carrick, 2001, p. 224; Porter, 1996, p. 208) in an organized institu
tional setting. Hence, caring for the sick, lame, and hurting within a
redemptive framework of belief created a pathway for the religious indi
vidual to simultaneously redeem herself from sin and also attend to 'the
least of these', as the Christian Gospels command (e.g., Matthew 25:
31-46).
As for the funding of these early Christian hospitals, we know that by
the fourth century they were supported by various bishops and other
operatives from within the early Christian church in addition to some
members of the landed aristocracy (Miller, 2004, pp.1184-5 passim).
Moreover, prior to the establishment of these first hospitals, by the
fourth century AD Christian guest houses, also called 'hospices', were
founded (Miller, 2004, p. 1184). These places of refuge were usually
overseen by nuns or assistants who were dedicated to the care and suste
nance of the poor, sick, or weary traveller. But hospices were not specifi
cally providers of medical care. This fact distinguishes them from the
later Christian hospitals which were generally overseen by at least one
doctor (iatros) Yet hospices and later hospitals were both supported by
the church and by donations from wealthier Roman families, and by oth
ers who were able to contribute something for their life-affirming ser
vices and care. Hence, it is fair to conclude that the redemptive impulse
was a leading motivational factor for those who established, supported,
and administered both hospices and hospitals during the late Roman
Empire.
But was there an even earlier forerunner to both the early Christian
hospital and its institutional predecessor, the hospice? Indeed so, the
pagan temples of the Greek physician-god, Asclepius. A famous exam
ple still stands in ruins at Epidaurus on mainland Greece; it was built
around 450 BC and operated until at least 395 AD. These religious temples
(asklepieia), of which over 400 were built during Pre-Christian antiquity,
once dotted the ancient landscape from Olympia to Constantinople
(modern day Istanbul). Funding for the Aesclepian temples generally
came from one of two sources: patients and their families seeking the
hypnotic dream-sleep cure (incubation) for one of their own; or wealthy
families seeking to fulfil their felt sense of civic virtue. In addition, there
were probably occasional contributions from nearby sponsoring Greek
city-states.
The physician-God Asclepius, son of Apollo, was said to have had the
power to rescue the sick from the jaws of death, and make whole the ill
and lame. But from the rational, non-superstitious perspective of tradi
tional Hippocratic medicine — grounded on the humoral theory of dis
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ease according to which a proper balance of the four humors assured the
patient's good health —these Aesclepian temples were at best last ditch
centres of care for those judged to be incurable. Therefore, hopeless, ter
minally ill patients often turned to supernatural Aesclepian remedies
when the Hippocratic physicians judged that there was nothing more
they could reasonably do. Can anyone doubt that these often desperate,
religiously inspired patients, and their similarly inspired, well intentioned Aesclepian priests—who sometimes dressed in flowing robes in
imitation of the god—both experienced some redemptive grace as they
sought heaven's divine cure? Whatever the outcome of this mystical
God-centred therapy, votive offerings and payments were received by
the Aesclepian healers from the suffering patient and her family. Thus, it
is safe to conclude that a sense of redemption (and a wished-for spiritual
and bodily wholeness) was involved in the funding and support of these
renowned pagan health care centres, too.

The Utilitarian Motive and Funding Military Medicine
Alongside religious temples and related medical sites associated with
the Greek god Asclepius, the Roman Empire saw fit to erect special infir
maries (valetudianaria) dedicated exclusively to soldiers. For example, it
was well recognized by the Roman Senate that soldiers who were
wounded in battle or faced other potential health emergencies needed
immediate care. 'A standard military hospital plan evolved', according
to Roy Porter, which had'... individual cells off a long corridor, a large
top-lit hall, latrines and baths' (Porter, 1999, p. 78). In contrast, the more
affluent Roman citizen would usually receive medical care not in a hos
pital but at the private house of his physician. Yet the poor and destitute
would be lucky to hobble or drag themselves to a religious shrine hoping
for some sort of miracle. Thus, for all but the military, the medical mar
ketplace of the Roman Empire was strictly speaking a laissez-faire situa
tion and most uneven in its distribution of medical services to the hoi
polloi.
Furthermore, the warrior-centred infirmaries were especially crucial
in helping to fortify the military strength of Rome's legionaries stationed
along the northern borders—where barbarians began to take a deadly
toll beginning in the fourth century especially (Miller, 2004, p. 1184). But
if so, how could one fairly describe the political and strategic motivation
of Rome (and later, many other countries) in creating and funding such
strategically placed military hospitals?
In essence, I would argue that this motivation may be fairly called
'utilitarian.' That is, a person, group, or institution is carrying out a par
ticular action or plan because, at bottom, it is believed to be helpful to
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securing the common good of all.5 So here generals and politicians,
under pressure from repeated waves of barbarian attacks, came to see
that their society as a whole would benefit if soldiers (injured, or threat
ened in battle, or otherwise at risk of losing their strength in war) were
provided competent medical care (relative to those times). Hence, these
soldiers could be restored to the task of defending their communities as
rapidly and efficiently as possible. What I am suggesting, then, is that
Rome funded military infirmaries (as did the French during the Napole
onic Wars, as did the federal Congress during the American Civil
War—the examples are endless) precisely because Rome realized that
trained and experienced soldiers were valuable state assets. These
human assets could do more effective work for the greater glory of the
whole society if they had doctors and other medical assistants at their
disposal when weakened or threatened by disease or wounds. In short,
publicly funded military infirmaries had social utility: they were useful
and productive medical institutions operated for the optimal benefit of
the state, its soldiers, and its citizens —all things considered.
Furthermore, centuries later in the modern British Isles, the English
medical doctor James Lind (1716-94) observed that 'armies had lost
"more of their men by sickness than by the sword", especially through
unsanitary camp conditions' (Porter, 1999, p. 294). In addition, the Scots
man and physician-general of the British Army, John Pringle
(1707-1782), scientifically corroborated Lind's insight by publishing
Observations on the Diseases of the Army (1752). In it, Pringle stressed
methods by which troops could adopt practical measures of hygiene in
order to prevent the most common battlefield diseases such as typhus,
dysentery, bilious fever, scabies, etc. Porter gives this estimate of the
impact of Pringle's Observations:
While not strikingly original, it captured the Enlightenment concern for
hygiene, public health, and the value of life. Pringle is also remembered for
developing the idea of the neutrality of the military hospital. At the battle of
Dettingen (1743), he proposed to the French commanding officer that the hos
pital tents on each side should be immune from the attack. The idea stuck
(Porter, 1999, pp. 294-5).

Are there other instructive examples of the utilitarian motive driving
state policy in favour of medical care or medical experimenta
tion—especially for those in the military? Examples abound: it is well
established that medical insights and innovative surgeries, procedures,
and therapies are often invented and tested in the crucible of war. For
[5]

By using the term 'utilitarian', I mean this in the pre-philosophical, naive sense of
that word. I am not here referring to classical utilitarianism associated with the
hedonic calculus famously authored by the nineteenth century English social
reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and his philosophical disciple, J.S. Mill
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example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, military
personnel were among the first to benefit from programs of mass inocu
lations. These followed discoveries by Jenner, Pasteur, Koch, and others
that such techniques could be effective in protecting against a myriad of
infectious diseases. Indeed, this was one of the more humanitarian and
dramatic benefits of discovering the germ theory.
For example, during the Boer War of 1899-1902, the British army suf
fered many disease-related casualties. Immunisation against typhoid
was discovered by Almroth Wright (1861-1947) in 1897. Yet few British
soldiers received the vaccinations due to irregular state policies that
were in place at the time. This was tragic. Porter clarifies that in the South
African theatre of the Boer War, 13,000 soldiers were killed by typhoid,
whereas 8,000 actually died in battle (Porter, 1999, p. 443). As a result of
this emergency, the British government formed a special commission to
study diseases related to war casualties. Thereafter, in 1913, it adopted a
policy of vaccinating all soldiers sent abroad against infectious diseases,
including typhoid fever. In point of fact, during the Boer War, the inci
dence of illness from typhoid fever was around 10%. In contrast, after
being vaccinated, the incidence of typhoid among British troops during
World War I (1914-18) dropped to around 2% (Porter, 1999, p. 443).
Also, tetanus was known to be a particularly dangerous disease for
soldiers, with the death rate of those infected usually standing at above
40%. So, by the beginning of World War I, decisive public health mea
sures were taken to protect the troops against tetanus. In general, this
disease had been especially hard on soldiers. The causal agent, later
identified as tetanospasmin, is a toxin secreted by the bacterium
Clostridium tetani which lives in the soil. Hence, when a soldier was
wounded, very typically 'the bacillus entered the body through gaping
shell wounds. [But] from 1915 [on], practically every wounded soldier
received the antitoxin, and so tetanus was dramatically reduced' (Por
ter, 1999, p. 443). Again, the utilitarian motive to provide competent and
immediate medical care for the military is seen to produce the best out
comes by helping to fortify the defences of a nation as a whole, whether
at war or at peace. And there were other social dividends. Civilian popu
lations in Britain and elsewhere were eventually protected by vaccina
tions, too, in medicine's fight against the ravages of typhoid, tetanus,
and other lethal diseases.

The Prudential Motive and Funding Quarantines
History records few things to be as frightening, alien, and disorienting to
human communities and their governments as the large scale public
health scourges known as epidemics. Epidemics may be defined as 'con
centrated outbursts of infectious or non-infectious disease, often with
unusually high mortality, affecting relatively large numbers of people
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within fairly narrow limits of time and space' (Evans, 2004, p. 789). The
most catastrophic epidemic in the entire history of Europe occurred dur
ing medieval times, spreading from rats to people, between 1347-51.1
am referring to the Bubonic plague. It is also called the Black Death due
to the telltale dark blotches that appeared on the faces of the doomed just
prior to their deaths. Shockingly, in just over three years, this pestilence
wiped out approximately twenty million people, about one quarter of
the entire population of Europe and the Mediterranean (Porter, 1999,
p. 123). It appeared episodically thereafter, too, arousing great fear and
consternation, but never with such sweeping force.
The Black Death likely originated in China. Then, from central Asia, it
spread via the Tatars to Italian merchants who were fighting the infected
Tatars for preferred trade routes in the Crimea. In returning to their
native Italy, the plague travelled with these Italian merchant-soldiers,
breaking out first in Messina and then in Genoa. So virulent was the
plague that most died within three days of being infected. Typically, the
most vulnerable included peasant families and the indigent poor. Even
without contracting such catastrophic epidemics, their average age at
death in 1400 was not much over 30 years (Porter, 1999, pp.122-127 pas
sim). And the unenviable truth is that these unfortunates were often left
to rot in their own bodily fluids when they were ordered to be involun
tarily quarantined. This happened in towns including Milan and Vienna
during the most deadly outbreaks of the plague. Moreover, relatively
few townspeople were lucky enough to flee in advance of these
scourges: there was little advance warning and few alternative destina
tions seemed safe. Hence, in trying to survive this fourteenth century
public health catastrophe, governments acted to protect themselves and
their citizens in ways that were barely rational (by contemporary stan
dards) and, from hindsight, often tragic, heartless, and futile.
To be sure, there were many factual misunderstandings about the true
nature of the plague that made most medical and governmental
responses ineffective. For one thing, the prevailing theory of health at
that time was still the Hippocratic humoral theory, with significant
refinements by Galen (AD 129-c. 216). This theory stated that if a person
becomes ill with an epidemic disease or any other malady it was at least
partly his or her own fault. Such vulnerability to disease was likely due
to some weakness or imbalance of one's four humors over which indi
viduals have some rational control through proper diet, exercise, and
sound hygiene. Following this logic, healthy people did not normally
get sick; and if they did they were probably responsible for it on some
level.
In addition, alongside the humoral theory there was a correlative
environmentally-based theory known as the miasmic theory of disease
(miasma was considered to be foul or polluted air). It held that conta
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gions arise from the stench of swamps, waste, and other rotting organic
debris. Humans breathed in this putrid air and so it tended to make us
sick—disturbing our internal humoral balance. More alarmingly, it was
widely held that once a person becomes infected with the plague, others
can acquire the disease just by touching that person or by standing in his
immediate vicinity. In addition, besides this pair of naturalistic theories
of disease (humoral and miasmic),6 there was still the influential super
natural theory of disease held by Christians and other mystics. This the
ory construed illness, and especially pestilence, as something sent by
God to punish sinning humanity. Therefore, this supernatural view of
disease only exacerbated the public's personal sense of panic, guilt,
self-loathing, and despair.
As a result of these theories of disease, citizens were sometimes
advised by local governmental authorities to evacuate their cities and
towns in advance of the relentless plague which, in fact, was caused (we
now know) by flea-infested rats.7 In addition, local governments in Italy,
France, Germany, and elsewhere enacted involuntary 'quarantines'
(this term derived from the Biblical quarantenaria meaning forty days)
against all those travellers and ships known to have originated from
ports or cities already infected by the plague (Porter, 1999, p.126). Local
governments also set up health boards in cities including Milan, Flor
ence, and Lucca. Also, they closed their borders if at all possible against
outsiders thought to be infected. In some cities, like Milan, they involun
tarily quarantined and sealed their own plague-infected citizens in their
own homes, leaving them to die. Both doctors and priests, who were
entrusted to care for the sick or perform Last Rites, also sometimes fled
for their lives in sheer terror of what might happen to them if they
remained behind to perform their official duties.
Therefore, as we have just seen, one of the most commonly used, pub
licly funded methods of restoring health and preventing disease, was
the state's deployment of the quarantine. Typically, this restrictive mea
sure could be applied to seaports or roads, halting shipping or com
merce; or to individuals and their families, limiting their freedom to
come and go as they pleased in their homes or neighbourhoods. Hence,
the method of quarantine—however unfairly, unevenly or unnecessar
[6]

[7]

One recalls that the humoral theory, according to which disease occurred when
one of the four humors (yellow bile, black bile, blood, phlegm) became excessive,
was completely overtaken by the germ theory by around 1880. The competing
miasmic theory held sway even later, until gradually losing ground to Koch's
bacteriological model of disease by the late nineteenth century.
The bacterial cause of the Black Death was subsequently discovered in 1894
during the Hong Kong epidemic by Japanese scientists A.Yersin and S. Kitasato.
By 1898, the French epidemiologist P. L. Simond showed that the transmission of
the bacillus, Yersinia pestis, was communicated from rats to humans via fleas: a
single bite from an infected flea could be fatal (Rosen, 1958, p. 324).
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ily applied in the fourteenth century—arguably embodied a prudent
method of rationally imposing preventive medicine measures on citi
zens (and strangers) with the goal of stopping the spread of this unfor
giving Black Death. (Again, the plague was thought to be a disease
transmissible by contact with the miasmic breath, or through touching
the open sores or even normal-looking skin of real or imagined victims
who were thought to be exposed to the contagion).
In sum, I think it is fair to conclude that a 'prudential motive' was
almost certainly at work in the decision to use state funds in deploying
the restrictive measures of quarantine. These funds were needed to
mount naval blockades of docks and ports, and to pay those workers
involved in identifying, apprehending, and enforcing involuntary
restrictions and other cordone sanitare for those suspected of being
infected. In general, a person, group, or institution may be said to be act
ing from a prudential motive when their resulting behaviour shows evi
dence of skilful selection, adaptation, or use of an appropriate means to a
desired end.8 Here, the desired end was halting the spread of the
bubonic plague by skilfully using a means that conformed to the best
medical thinking of the day. Unlike the 'utilitarian motive', cited earlier,
the prudential motive does not require the actor to contemplate the more
universal consideration of what constitutes the common good of society.
Instead, prudential acts merely involve a scaled back, lower-order focus
on what seems more or less appropriate to the situation at hand here and
now. Thus, the scope of awareness (what I call the 'epistemic scope') of a
prudentially motivated act is somewhat less encompassing than its utili
tarian counterpart in the long run.9

The Charitable Motive and Funding Inoculations
Who can doubt that a fourth type of motivation, what I am here calling
the'charitable motivation', is also involved in carrying out humane acts
of medical care? The charitable impulse has deep historical roots. We
observe the author of the Hippocratic treatise Precepts, who practised
medicine in Athens during the first century BC, admonishing his fellow
physicians thusly: 'And if there be an opportunity to serving one who is
a stranger in financial straits, give full assistance to all such. For where
there is love of man, there is also love of the art' (Precepts 6; quoted in
] My definition is modified slightly from the Webster's Third New International
t Dictionary (1965, p. 1824), to include the Aristotelian notion of 'appropriate'
choice. Hence, the prudent motive leads to actions that are moral, not merely
clever. Such actions, following Aristotle (384-322 BC), ultimately involve the
larger issue of determining what is good for man. See also Copleston (1962, Vol. 1,
Part 2, p. 86).
| The possible objection that this scope of awareness may be more a matter of
degree than kind is discussed in the penultimate section of this paper, below.

30

Distributing Health Care

Carrick, 2001, p. xviii). Indeed, one can hear in these distant words a
commitment to the importance of empathy and charity in the treating of
the outsider, the sick, and the destitute. What's more, the Homeric tales
of Zeus, Dionysus, and Artemus, among other Olympians, fostered an
awareness in the pagan mind that the gods themselves could appear
incarnate as human strangers in need. So it would be wise to greet the
stranger in need carefully but never meanly.
Nor can one ignore that a selfless response to the suffering of the
stranger is affirmed both in the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Gospels.
While charity is a Christian virtue endorsed in the parable of the Good
Samaritan, Jewish tradition also affirms the importance of compassion
toward those in need, as the story Jonah and the whale affirms. This type
of other-centred, charitable motivation is characterized by a deeply felt
impulse to extend a helping hand: to succour the sick and broken with a
saving, caring touch.
Formally defined, 'charitable motivations' are those evidenced by a
kindly and sympathetic disposition aimed at rendering aid to the needy
or suffering.10 Such acts typically involve freely giving to others goods or
services of value that could otherwise have been withheld. In addition, it
is interesting to recall that the eighteenth century German philosopher
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) regarded acts of charity as imperfect
duties.11 That is, properly speaking, such acts may never be morally
required of another as would, by comparison, such perfect duties (in
Kantian language) as the repayment of a personal loan. Again, perfect
duties are always obligatory duties for Kant, never optional. And so, for
Kant, as for most of us living in the twenty-first century, charitable acts
such as sending money to the International Red Cross for food relief in
Sri Lanka are praiseworthy but strictly speaking optional. They cannot
in the ordinary sense be morally required.
But is this really a fair description of charitable acts in the context of
contemporary medical care? Yes and no. For while one may not requirea
physician in private practice in the United States, say, to donate his or
her medical services to the needy poor, there are acknowledged limits to
the exercise of such professional options. For example, it is a recognized!
medical and moral duty not to cause (or allow by acts of omission) some
one who is penniless to die on the front door of one's clinic just because
they cannot afford emergency medical services. Again, if life-saving aid
[10] Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1965), p. 378, hereafter WID.
'Charity' derives from the Late Latin word 'caritas', meaning Christian love.
Webster's defines the latter as: 'the virtue or act of loving God with a love which
transcends that for creatures; loving others for the sake of God' (WID, 1965, p. 378,
my emphasis).
[11] Kant, I. (1875,1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (New York: Harper
Torchbooks).
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that could have been rendered was in point of fact withheld, would this
heartless inaction not be widely and justifiably condemned? Moreover,
since for Kant charitable acts also conform to the moral law (what he
called the 'Categorical Imperative') — according to which persons ought
to be treated as ends in themselves, never as mere means — charitable
acts are in any event exemplary and praiseworthy.
To summarise, we may observe in these persistent religious, scientific,
and humanistic traditions —from Hippocratic precepts, to JudeoChristian scriptures, to Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant —an
implicit affirmation of the importance of the charitable impulse as a nec
essary condition for membership in the moral community. I dare say
this humane tendency to consider the safety and welfare of the other is
one of the enduring legacies of our ancient and modern past embodied
at least in part in our own age by social workers and health care profes
sionals, plus the government agencies and taxpayers who tacitly agree
to fund and facilitate their good works.
In addition, within the ethos and norms of the public health move
ment as it arose from roughly the eighteenth century to our own day,
charitable acts may include providing bandages, prescription medi
cines, crutches, inoculations, surgical procedures, pure drinking water,
fresh linen, etc., at little or no direct cost to the recipient. Indeed, with the
gradual acceptance of Louis Pasteur's (1822-96) germ theory by about
1875, and the gradual adoption of Robert Koch's (1843-1910) bacterio
logical model of disease about twenty-five years later, doctors, medical
researchers, and public health officials were increasingly encouraged by
the promising social and health implications of these stunning scientific
breakthroughs. Hence, during the nineteenth century when it came to
using public or private funds with the end in view of restoring or pre
serving the health of the masses, government officials began to push for
a variety of preventive medicine measures. Perhaps chief among the
more controversial of these measures was the deployment of public
inoculation programmes. To be sure, inoculations were attempted, at
various times, to thwart a variety of deadly diseases including cholera,
smallpox, diphtheria, and malaria. (Inoculations were later called 'vac
cinations', once specific vaccines were developed containing the immu
nising antigens or micro-organisms which were then injected). In fact,
Rosen states that the method of inoculation was known to healers
throughout the world at least since the early 1700s, and probably earlier
in the East and Orient (Rosen, 1958, p. 184). As a technique, it became
established in medical circles under the simple-sounding principle,
'Like cures like.'
For example, it was known to some midwives and others that expo
sure of a non-infected person to a series of weakened (attenuated) doses
of a pathogen, say, measles, somehow had the power to render that 'in-

32

Distributing Health Care

oculated' person immune from the very disease to which she had been
intentionally exposed (Rosen, 1958, p. 183). While inoculation was an
extremely useful method,12 many in England and elsewhere during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were sceptical. They worried, not
altogether without justification in the early days of the technique, that
those exposed to excessive or corrupted doses of the allegedly life-sav
ing pathogens might somehow grow ill and die. As we saw in our earlier
account of the bubonic plague, these horrific epidemics were capable of
wiping out whole generations: labourers, farmers, merchants, crafts
man, sailors, the landed gentry —none were spared. Philosophically,
most adults came to realize that all people were in some sense true
equals before the onslaught of these unyielding scourges. Predictably,
as the techniques of inoculation and vaccine development became more
efficient and reliable—thanks to the early efforts against smallpox by
researchers like Edward Jenner in 1796, and over a century-and-a
half-later against polio by researchers like Jonas Salk in 1953 — the pub
lic's scepticism and resistance against inoculation programs slowly gave
way to guarded acceptance.13
Of course, these inoculation programs were actually not free but were
usually funded by governments or, in some cases, supported by the
emerging health care professions, or by monies donated by pioneering
medical researchers and their sponsoring labs and institutes. Such pro
grams were initially, at least, cast as charitable programs for the
improvement of the health and welfare of the poor. This preventive
medicine trend gradually spread across Europe as the method of inocu
lation became perfected, and as the science and clinical evidence back
ing it up gradually won both scientific and popular acceptance by the
middle of the nineteenth century.
In fact, it was in England, with the publication in 1798 of Edward Jen
ner's paper, 'An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae
Vaccinae ... [Known as] Cow pox', that the efficacy of using vaccines in
the process of inoculation was established. Jenner, a country doctor and
clergyman's son who studied in London under John Hunter, was one of
the first medical scientists to endorse the widespread use of inoculations
in his fight against smallpox (Rosen, 1958, p. 188ff; Porter, 1999,
p. 274ff.). To Jenner's remarkable achievement we now turn.

[12] Specifically, smallpox inoculation was known as 'variolation', although the term
is now rarely used.
[13] Even now, this acceptance is somewhat fragile and wont to slip: witness the
suspicion of the combined measles, mumps, and rubella inoculation in the UK in
the late 1990s, that grew from a study linking the vaccine to serious side-effects.
Despite the study being roundly and openly discredited at the time by the
broader scientific community, these suspicions lingered for some time.
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Rosen reminds us that, during Jenner's lifetime (1749-1823), smallpox
was one of the most feared diseases in Europe and America —a leading
cause of death. 'It smouldered endemically in city and town, flaring up
recurrently into epidemic outbreaks ... According to William Douglas,
writing in 1760, smallpox was a chief cause of the high infant mortality in
Europe' (Rosen, 1958, p.184). Porter adds: ' "The speckled monster" had
become virulent throughout Europe, responsible in bad years for per
haps a tenth of all deaths; Queen Mary of England (1662-94) died of it, as
did Louis XV (1710-74) of France' (Porter, 1999, pp. 274-75). Thanks
largely to Jenner's experiments, inoculation caught on as a protective
measure against smallpox in England, along with preventive medicine
programs against other deadly diseases, by 1900. Even so, there were
still those who held out. For example, some of the Calvinists in Scotland
resisted inoculation on grounds that rendering a patient immune
through human intervention interfered with Divine Providence. In con
trast, the philosophes in France, including Voltaire (1694-1778), endorsed
inoculations as a boon to mankind; the practice was officially endorsed
by the French government in 1750.
Back in England, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762), the wife
of a British consul in Constantinople, was a forceful early advocate. In
fact, she decided to have her five-year-old daughter inoculated against
smallpox in London, in 1721. This she did after having observed a few
years earlier a somewhat cruder form of the technique used by peasant
women in Turkey (Porter, 1999, p. 275; Rosen, 1958, p. 186). Across the
seas, in Colonial America, the clergyman Cotton Mather (1663-1728)
was also a strong advocate of inoculation. '[H]e knew about suffering,
having had to watch as two wives and thirteen of his fifteen children
succumbed to disease' (Porter, 1999, p. 175).
To clarify, the immediate aim of smallpox inoculation was to induce a
mild dose of the disease in a non-infected person, thereby conferring
lifelong immunity without causing unsightly pock-marking or any
other harmful consequence (Porter, 1999, p. 275). Before he began his
experiments that led to the groundbreaking development of an effective
smallpox vaccine, Jenner was familiar with traditional inoculations. In
performing them, he aimed to infect his subjects with weakened doses of
the smallpox material in order to confer immunity. In the process of per
forming traditional inoculation, Jenner noticed something odd: those
subjects who had earlier contracted cowpox—a disease of cattle occa
sionally contracted by humans — had evidenced no reaction whatsoever
to his traditional smallpox inoculation. That is, they appeared to be
immune to smallpox.
But Jenner did not feel confident with his observation. So, remember
ing the challenging words of his professor, John Hunter, 'Why not ...
experiment?', Jenner decided to test his hypothesis. What if the cowpox
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had properties that could be developed into a vaccine that would render
subjects immune to smallpox?
In 1796, an opportunity to try out this idea presented itself. Jenner inoculated
a boy, James Phipps, with cowpox matter taken from the hand of a milkmaid,
Sarah Nelmes, who had acquired the infection naturally. Then after several
weeks he inoculated the boy with smallpox, but it failed to take—James
Phipps was immune to smallpox. (Rosen, 1958, p. 188).

Ironically, when Jenner first tried to present the result of his experiment
to the Royal Society, he was refused. Soon thereafter, however, his
results were accepted in 1798 under a more modest title. Within just
three years, his 'Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae
Vaccinae' received widespread attention in Continental Europe and
America. In fact, it was published in a third edition by 1801, and went
into Latin, German, French, American, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese
editions by 1803 (Porter, 1999, pp. 276-77).
To the layperson, the often missed epidemiological significance of
Jenner's contribution is that while smallpox was fatal to humans, cow
pox was benign. Therefore, if Jenner were able to develop a vaccine from
the cowpox material, the inoculation process would in this case be mea
surably safer. Moreover, if his hypothesis proved correct, a successful
cowpox vaccine could then be developed in larger quantities, and dis
pensed to more subjects more cheaply and efficiently than the tradi
tional inoculation. For the latter technique did not strictly speaking
require vaccination at all; mere exposure, through whatever medium,
would do. In addition, things could run amok using traditional inocula
tion. For one thing, the inoculated person could sometimes contract the
full disease from the attenuated dosage if the quantities were too potent
or the exposures were too frequent, and die. Second, if the aim was to
inoculate large numbers of people there was a substantially greater risk
that something could go wrong with the quantity and quality of the
materia medica of the dosages themselves since the chemistries were not
that well understood.
No doubt a lasting hallmark of the practical significance of Jenner's
discovery of the smallpox vaccine is the greater confidence it inspired
toward the medical community itself among the people whose lives he
and others helped to save through the deployment of massive and often
charitable vaccination programs. At first, this was the case for smallpox
but later for a long list of deadly diseases that were defeated or resisted
via the vaccination process which Jenner helped develop and perfect. In
so doing, Jenner may also be said to have laid the initial groundwork for
the science of immunology. Indeed, once Jenner's vaccination tech
niques gained currency, his discoveries were further confirmed in 1800
by Harvard Medical School's first professor of physic, Benjamin Water
house (1754-1846). Waterhouse published his own confirmation under
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the title, 'A prospect of exterminating the smallpox" (Rosen, 1958,
p. 189). In addition, President Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) became an
active supporter of Waterhouse, arguing forcefully for public vaccina
tion programs as a civic imperative (Rosen, 1958, p. 189). Connecting the
motive of charity to Jenner's scientific breakthrough, Rosen states that a
benefactor by the name of Valentine Seaman was the first advocate of
mass vaccination in America. In 1802, Seaman originated in New York
the 'Institute for Inoculation .." the main purpose of which was to fur
nish inoculations free of charge to the poor (Rosen, 1958, p. 189). In Eng
land, over 5000 individuals had been vaccinated by 1799 alone. The
practice was deemed so important in Sweden that it was made compul
sory. In contrast, compulsory vaccination was resisted for a time in Eng
land for fear the rights of individuals would be trampled by the state
(Porter, 1999, p. 277; Rosen, 1958, pp. 189-90). The situation in Germany
was arguably even more progressive.
The German government briefly explored the idea of 'Medical Police',
a term meant to convey the need for a government administered pro
gram of health protection for all citizens. Its principal proponent was
Johann Peter Frank (1748-1821) who wrote a six volume work on this
topic which was published between 1779-1819. But the project never
really reached fruition until after 1871 when a central department of
public health came into being. By 1883, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck
(1815-1898) introduced for the first time a system of medical social
insurance. 'Bismarck's system became a model for other European coun
tries, including Britain' (Chave, 1986, pp. 8-9). In France, Napoleon
(1761-1821) was so taken in by the seeming miracle of defeating small
pox by Jenner's technique that he ordered his entire army vaccinated. He
is further reported to have said: 'Anything Jenner wants shall be
granted' (Porter, 1999, p. 277). Not to be outdone, in 1802, the English
Parliament awarded Jenner a prize of £10,000. Just a year later, in 1803,
the Royal Jennerian Society was founded. Its prime aim was to promote
vaccination for the masses as part of a charitable and humane program.
Indeed, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, rulers in Europe and
elsewhere embraced the general dictum that the promotion of health
was essential to a well functioning state (Porter, 1999, p. 277).

Summary: Four Motives Supportive of Public Health
I began this paper by conjecturing that any effort to pursue a unified psy
chological, sociological, or philosophical explanation for that most
remarkable of human practices, namely, the decision of governments,
institutions, or groups to use public or private funds in order to succour
the sick or make whole the injured, would almost certainly face treacher
ous seas. Based on the evidence gathered here, I submit that this conjec
ture has so far been confirmed.
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But while a unified, monolithic account of the public or private fund
ing of health care has eluded our capture, what we have discovered dur
ing this voyage has in some ways proved more instructive. We have
discovered a broad, multifaceted account that accommodates a wider
range of historical periods and governing philosophies than any single
explanatory principle would likely do. Why would a single explanatory
principle not fly? Because, as should be evident from the present sketch
drawn from 2500 years of social history, things are just not that tidy in
the chronicles of Western governments and in the diaries of the common
people over which they ruled. Hence, despite the fact that no unifying
raison d'etre has emerged to account for the seemingly altruistic behav
iour that lead to the public or private funding of health care, this result is
hardly cause for despair.
In point of fact, we have identified and characterised at least four criti
cally important human motivations that are often involved in preserv
ing, restoring, or enhancing the health and well-being of citizens. These
action-guiding elements include the redemptive, utilitarian, prudential,
and charitable motives. Furthermore, any one or more of these motives
qualifies as sufficient conditions. That is, when present they tend to func
tion as contributing causes psychologically and morally in almost any
decision-making process that leads individuals, groups, institutions, or
governments to actually fund health care for the masses (at whatever
level of funding). Thus, by being made more aware of the necessary con
ditions involved in this decision-making process, we have come closer
to a fuller understanding of the tableau of human impulses, volitions,
and choices that encourage such other-directed, socially conscious pro
jects as those associated with what is now widely called the public health
movement.

Objection and Reply: Oversimplifying Choice and Action?
Nevertheless, some may object that the picture I have just painted com
mits the fallacy of oversimplication.14 This it allegedly does because the
four motives which I have explicated as more or less discrete concepts in
our four central illustrations — the funding of hospitals, military medi
cine, quarantines, and inoculations — may sometimes overlap with each
other. But, as I will show, this objection is hardly fatal. In fact, properly
understood, it reminds us that some apparent impediments from the
logical point of view turn out to be little more than instructive mirages
when viewed from the right angle, i.e., with a deeper understanding, in
this instance, of how language and thought actually work together.
[14] An earlier version of this objection was suggested to me by Niall Maclean. The
core fallacy is of course committed when one takes a complex thing and construes
it to be much simpler than it really is.
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So let us suppose, for the sake of discussion, that the preceding objec
tion is correct: our four motives do sometimes overlap in their
action-guiding capacities. Hence, suppose that what I have described as
the'charitable motive' to give aid to the needy by funding inoculations,
may at times overlap with the 'redemptive motive'. Thus, the redemp
tive motive, too, may impel an actor to accomplish the same end out of
(in this case) a basic love of God. Does the fact that one or more of these
motives may overlap undermine all that we have come to understand so
far?
Not at all. If anything, the fact that these four motives may occasion
ally overlap invites us to ask a critical question, one with illuminating
implications for how the human mind, choice, and volition shape indi
vidual or institutional conduct in what some call the phenomenology of
action. Is it realistic to assume that the diverse impulses and motives at
work as we experience ourselves and others in the world, and as we act
on things in the world to accomplish desired ends, are in fact as rigidly
distinct as we sometimes imagine them to be? In short, is the existential
and psychological process of deliberation and decision-making messier
than we imagine?
In my view, the only honest answer is yes. We often talk as (/concepts
and motives are more rigid and discrete than they really are. But why?
We do so, I suggest, mainly as a short-hand technique by which we may
more conveniently and efficiently negotiate the world. This technique
includes, at the highest deliberative levels of government, the orchestra
tion of the collective motives and agendas of diverse political constitu
ents needed to build a consensus aimed at establishing sound health
care policies within democratic societies. As a result of these practical
insights, social habits, and collective capacities, we do not have to spell
out everything that we are experiencing in tedious, time-consuming
detail in order to get things done in our households, communities, or
nation states.
In addition, I conjecture that neither the worlds we regularly mediate
and describe through the multiple lens of language, nor the higher-order
concepts that anchor our action-guiding motives and impulses within
the common ethos of our natural languages, behave in the artificially
rigid and inflexible ways we sometimes imagine. In fact, based on my
own observations, I would argue that the discrete, action-guiding
motives we have been exploring (the redemptive, utilitarian, pruden
tial, and charitable motives) do, in fact 'give'; that is, they do indeed
'overlap' and 'interpenetrate' in the mind of the actor. Again, this hap
pens especially when they converge on common ends that are deemed
worthy of execution by citizens, institutions, or governments. Further
more, our four central motives behave in this flexible, overlapping man
ner precisely because, at bottom, they turn out to be conceptually related
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in an interesting, suggestive way. That is, they bear what could be called
a family resemblance to one another.15 If so, as members of the same
loosely related conceptual family (to be named below), is it so surprising
that our four leading motives may overlap in various contexts?
So again, to admit that there is this occasional overlapping of concepts
hardly spills the wind from our sails. Instead, it usefully serves to
remind us that as actors, whether legislators, kings, or citizens, our
motives may sometimes work in concert but also manifest in 'mixed',
creative, and even contradictory ways. It hardly follows from this that
the four motives in question have no distinct characteristics, or no
proper limits of usage. Indeed, as I have suggested, they may be flexible,
overlapping, yet more or less discrete—without conceptual embarrass
ment or loss of explanatory power in any robust theory of human
action.16 Hence, the objection from oversimplification need not foul the
lines of our analysis any further.

Conclusion: Philanthropy and Funding Public Health
What, then, is the name of the parent concept to which the four central
motives under investigation may be said to bear a family resemblance?
One gets a bold hint, I suggest, by reflecting further on the now familiar
passage of the Hippocratic author of Precepts.
And if there be an opportunity to serving one who is a stranger in financial
straits, give full assistance to all such. For where there is love of man
(philanthropia), there is also love of the art.17

If my intuition is right, our four motives, properly speaking, are
related to the higher-order concept of 'philanthropy'; at its root, it liter
ally means 'loving mankind' (derived from the Greek philia = love, and
anthropos = mankind). In contemporary usage, philanthropy may be
defined as: (1) 'good will toward one's fellow man, especially as
expressed through active efforts to promote human welfare'; or (2) 'an

[15] By using the phrase 'family resemblance', I am adapting Wittgenstein's
terminology. My simple point is that these four motives—the redemptive,
utilitarian, prudential, and charitable—may, in fact, share no easily identifiable
common characteristic. Yet, like members of a human family who may not look
much like one another individually but are nevertheless recognisable as bearing a
similar family resemblance or orientation, we likewise notice the shared
relatedness of these four motives. This we do because they often appear in similar
contexts and behave in similar ways (often moving us toward acts or programs
that assist others). See Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), section 67.
[16] A complete theory of action, while outside the scope of this paper, may be found
in L. Davis's Theory of Action (Davis, 1979).
[17] For a different take on the Hippocratic trad ition of philanthropy, which construes
occasional pro bono medical care as a clever way for doctors to improve their
reputations, see Edelstein (1967).
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act or instance of deliberate generosity: a contribution made in the spirit
of humanitarianism' (Webster's Dictionary, 1965, p. 1697).
I submit that actions arising from the redemptive motive, which seek to
benefit mankind out of a love of God and so lead quite naturally to the
funding of hospitals, bear a family resemblance to this parent notion of
philanthropy (as defined above). So, too, actions arising from the utilitar
ian motive, which seek to optimise the balance of well-being over misery
and so lead quite naturally to the funding of military medicine for the
better defence of the community, also bear a family resemblance to our
notion of philanthropy. As for the prudential motive, was it not predicated
on selecting appropriate means to desired ends? Can anyone doubt that,
even today, the funding of medical quarantines is sometimes the desir
able thing to do —in order to reduce human suffering and benefit those
citizens not yet infected? This last consideration also links the prudential
motive in a familial way to our core notion of philanthropy: however dif
ficult to enact and enforce, quarantines can and do serve humanitarian
purposes, too. Lastly, there is the charitable motive. This encourages
actions aimed at aiding the needy or suffering and so lead quite natu
rally to the funding of inoculations designed to prevent the spread of
communicable diseases like smallpox. It also bears an obvious family
resemblance to our preceding notion of philanthropy.
My final conjecture is that our notion of philanthropy loosely unites
and subsumes each of our four central motives in at least two interesting
and parallel ways. First, it interfaces with the redemptive and charitable
motives by helping us notice that these both aim to generate good will
and promote human welfare — the former for the glory of God, and the
later for the sake of the poor. Second, it interfaces with the utilitarian and
prudential motives by helping us notice that these both aim to promote
the health of citizens by restoring the national defence and by blocking
the spread of epidemics — the former for the sake of balancing optimal
outcomes, the later for the sake of finding appropriate means to wise
ends. If so, 'philanthropy', as here defined, may be said to constitute a
basic concept which both links and illuminates the fuller meanings and
potential psychological powers of the redemptive, utilitarian, pruden
tial, and charitable motivations as we experience the effects of these
forces in our lives.
But if this is the case, then I must modify an earlier important claim.
While it is still true that no monolithic philosophy or care-giving princi
ple emerges from the historical record to account for why governments,
religious institutions, or other groups may have decided, over the centu
ries, to support the funding of health care, it would now be false to con
clude that there is no unity at all in the four leading motives we have
identified. What unites them is precisely the humanitarian vision that
good will toward one's fellow man involves consideration of a
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higher-order philanthropic imperative. The imperative in question
asserts that we ought to work to reduce human suffering and promote,
as generously as possible, the well-being of all citizens. I am calling this
imperative the philanthropic imperative.
Consider further: If this philanthropic imperative were wholeheart
edly endorsed by the international community of nations, what would
happen? If these nations worked openly together to achieve humane
medical care through cooperative arrangements with each other and
with such groups such as the World Health Organization, would not the
funding of sound public health programs tend to flourish on a more
responsive and extensive global scale than they do today?18
In my judgment, the answer is yes. At bottom, the international
endorsement of the philanthropic imperative—which I have here rein
terpreted as a core value at the heart of any humane program of public
medicine — would go a long way toward building and sustaining sound
programs of global health for planet Earth and its many inhabitants well
into the twenty-first century.19

[18] Consistent with at least part of my conclusion, it is interesting to observe that the
world's largest private philanthropic institution, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, has christened their 'Global Health Initiative' as a current top
priority. See www.gatesfoundation.org for details.
[19] I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Philip Wilson, a medical historian at
Pennsylvania State University's College of Medicine, Hershey, PA, for helpful
criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks, too, to Professor David
Hufford, Chair, Department of Humanities, and the staff of the George T. Harrell
Medical Library at Hershey, for arranging guest scholar privileges during the
2006 summer term.

